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Abstract
We analyze arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
These channels are subject to two attacks at the same time: one pas-
sive (eavesdropping), and one active (jamming). We progress on previous
works [11] and [12], by introducing a reduced class of allowed codes that
fulfills a more stringent secrecy requirement than earlier definitions. In
addition, we prove that non-symmetrizability of the legal link is sufficient
for equality of the deterministic and the common randomness assisted se-
crecy capacities. At last, we focus on analytic properties of both secrecy
capacities: We completely characterize their discontinuity points, and their
super-activation properties.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years the developments in modern communication systems pro-
duced many results in a short amount of time. Especially quantum commu-
nication systems allow us to exploit new possibilities while at the same time
imposing fundamental limitations.
Quantum mechanics differs significantly from classical mechanics, it has its
own laws. Quantum information theory unifies information theory with quantum
mechanic, generalizing classical information theory to the quantum world. The
unit of quantum information is called the "qubit", the quantum analogue of
the classical "bit". Unlike a bit, which is either "0" or "1", a qubit can be in
"superposition", i.e. both states at the same time, this is a fundamental tool in
quantum information and computing.
A quantum channel is a communication channel which can transmit quantum
information. In general, there are two ways to represent a quantum channel with
linear algebraic tools, either as a sum of several transformations, or as a single
unitary transformation which explicitly includes the unobserved environment.
Quantum channels can transmit both classical and quantum information. We
consider the capacity of quantum channels carrying classical information. This
is equivalent to considering the capacity of classical-quantum channels, where
the classical-quantum channels are quantum channels whose sender’s inputs
are classical variables. The classical capacity of quantum channels has been
determined in [19], [19], [22], and [23].
Our goal is to investigate in communication that takes place over a quantum
channel which is, in addition to the noise from the environment, subjected to
the action of a jammer which actively manipulates the states. The messages
ought also to be kept secret from an eavesdropper.
A classical-quantum channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel, where the jammer may change his input in every
channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. In
the model of an arbitrarily varying channel, we consider a channel which is not
stationary and can change with every use. We interpret this as an attack of
a jammer. It works as follows: the sender and the receiver have to select their
coding scheme first. After that the jammer makes his choice of the channel state
to sabotage the message transmission. However, due to the physical properties,
we assume that the jammer’s changes only take place in a known set.
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The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in [8]. [2] showed a
surprising result which is known as the Ahlswede Dichotomy: Either the capacity
of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero or it equals its shared randomness
assisted capacity. After the discovery in [8] it remained as an open question
when the deterministic capacity is positive. In [17] a sufficient condition for
that has been given, and in [15] it is proved that this condition is also necessary.
The Ahlswede Dichotomy demonstrates the importance of shared randomness
for communication in a very clear form.
In [4] the capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is an-
alyzed. A lower bound of the capacity has been given. An alternative proof
of [4]’s result and a proof of the strong converse are given in [7]. In [3] the
Ahlswede Dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is
established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic
capacity is given. In [13] a simplification of this condition for the arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum channels is given.
In the model of a wiretap channel we consider secure communication. This
was first introduced in [27]. We interpret the wiretap channel as a channel with
an eavesdropper. For a discussion of the relation of the different security criteria
we refer to [10] and [24].
A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classical-quantum
wiretap channel, its secrecy capacity has been determined in [16] and [14].
This work is a progress of our previous papers [11] and [12], where we consid-
ered channel robustness against jamming and at the same time security against
eavesdropping. A classical-quantum channel with a jammer and at the same time
an eavesdropper is called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel. It is defined as a family of pairs of indexed channels {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, . . . , T}
with a common input alphabet and possible different output systems, connect-
ing a sender with two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper, where t is called
a channel state of the channel pair. The legitimate receiver accesses the out-
put of the first part of the pair, i.e., the first channel Wt in the pair, and the
wiretapper observes the output of the second part, i.e., the second channel Vt.
A channel state t, which varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner,
governs both the legal receiver’s channel and the wiretap channel. A code for
the channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper
knows nothing about the transmitted information.
In [11] we established the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily
varying channel is zero or equals its randomness assisted capacity. Our proof is
similar to the proof of the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum channels in [4]: we build a two-part code word, the first part is used to
create the common randomness for the sender and the legal receiver, the second
is used to transmit the message to the legal receiver. We also analyzed the se-
crecy capacity when the sender and the receiver used various resources. In [12]
we determined the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted cod-
ing of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. We also examined
when the secrecy capacity was a continuous function of the system parameters.
Furthermore, we proved the phenomenon “super-activation” for arbitrarily vary-
ing classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., there were two channels, both with
zero deterministic secrecy capacity, such that if they were used together they
allowed perfect secure transmission with positive deterministic secrecy capacity.
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Combining the results of these two paper we get the formula for deterministic
secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
Figure 1: Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel
As aforementioned the lower bound in [11] and [12] is shown by building a
two-part deterministic code. However that code concept still leaves something
to be desired because we had to reduce the generality of the code concept when
we explicitly allowed a small part of the code word to be non-secure. The code
word we built was a composition of a public code word to synchronize the second
part and a common randomness assisted code word to transmit the message.
We only required security for the last part. As we will show in Corollary 4.1,
when the jammer has access to the first part, it will be rendered completely
useless. Thus the code concept only works when the jammer is limited in his
action, e.g. we have to assume that eavesdropper cannot send messages towards
the jammer. Nevertheless this code concept with weak criterion can be useful
when small amount of public messages is desired, e.g. when the receiver uses
it to estimate the channels. In this work we consider the general code concept
when we construct a code in such a way that every part of it is secure. We show
that when the legal channel is not symmetrizabel the sender can send a small
amount of secure transmissions which push the secure capacity to the maximally
attainable value. Thus the entire security is granted. We call it the strong code
concept. This completes our analysis of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel.
In [11] we analyzed the secrecy capacities of various coding schemes with
resource assistance. We showed that when the jammer was not allowed to has
access to the resource, it was very helpful for the secure message transmission
through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. In this work
we analyze the case when the shared randomness is not secure against the jam-
mer.
In [12] we showed that the secrecy capacity was in general not a continuous
function of the system parameters. In [11] we proved super-activation for ar-
bitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. In this work we establish
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complete characterizations for continuity and positivity of the capacity func-
tion of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, and a complete
characterization for super-activation.
This paper is organized as follows:
The main definitions are given in Section 2.
In Section 3.1 we determine a secrecy capacity formula for a mixed channel
model which is called the classic arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel.
This formula is used for our result in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.2 our main result is presented. In this section we determine the
secrecy capacity for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels under
strong code concept.
In Section 4.1 we analyze when the sender and the legal receiver had the
possibility to use shared randomness which is not secure against the jammer.
We also determine the secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels shared randomness which is secure against eavesdropping.
As an application of the results of our earlier works, in Section 4.2 we es-
tablish when the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel is positive and when it is a continuous quantity of the system
parameters. Furthermore we show when “super-activation” occurs for arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
2 Basic Definitions and Communication Scenar-
ios
For a finite set A we denote the set of probability distributions on A by P (A).
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be Hermitian operators on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space G. We say ρ1 ≥ ρ2 and ρ2 ≤ ρ1 if ρ1 − ρ2 is positive-semidefinite. For
a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space G, we denote the (convex) space of
density operators on G by
S(G) := {ρ ∈ L(G) : ρ is Hermitian, ρ ≥ 0G , tr(ρ) = 1} ,
where L(G) is the set of linear operators on G, and 0G is the null matrix on G.
Note that any operator in S(G) is bounded.
For finite setsA andB, we define a (discrete) classical channel V:A→ P (B),
A 3 x→ V(x) ∈ P (B) to be a system characterized by a probability transition
matrix V(·|·). For x ∈ A and y ∈ B, V(y|x) expresses the probability of the
output symbol y when we send the symbol x through the channel. The channel
is said to be memoryless if the probability distribution of the output depends
only on the input at that time and is conditionally independent of previous
channel inputs and outputs. Further we can extend this definition when we
define a classical channel to a map V: P (A) → P (B) by denoting V(y|p) :=∑
x∈A p(x)V(y|x).
Let n ∈ N. We define the n-th memoryless extension of the stochastic ma-
trix V by Vn, i.e., for xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An and yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Bn,
Vn(yn|xn) = ∏ni=1 V(yi|xi).
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces G and G′ a quantum channel
N : S(G) → S(G′), S(G) 3 ρ → N(ρ) ∈ S(G′) is represented by a completely
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positive trace-preserving map which accepts input quantum states in S(G) and
produces output quantum states in S(G′).
If the sender wants to transmit a classical message of a finite set A to the
receiver using a quantum channel N , his encoding procedure will include a
classical-to-quantum encoder to prepare a quantum message state ρ ∈ S(G)
suitable as an input for the channel. If the sender’s encoding is restricted to
transmit an indexed finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G), then we
can consider the choice of the signal quantum states ρx as a component of the
channel. Thus, we obtain a channel σx := N(ρx) with classical inputs x ∈ A
and quantum outputs, which we call a classical-quantum channel. This is a map
N: A → S(G′), A 3 x → N(x) ∈ S(G′) which is represented by the set of
|A| possible output quantum states {σx = N(x) := N(ρx) : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G′),
meaning that each classical input of x ∈ A leads to a distinct quantum output
σx ∈ S(G′). In view of this, we have the following definition.
Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. A classical-quantum
channel is a linear map W : P (A) → S(H), P (A) 3 P → W (P ) ∈ S(H). Let
a ∈ A. For a Pa ∈ P (A), defined by Pa(a′) =
{
1 if a′ = a ;
0 if a′ 6= a , we write W (a)
instead of W (Pa).
Remark 2.1. Frequently a classical-quantum channel is defined as a map A→
S(H), A 3 a→ W (a) ∈ S(H). This is a special case when the input is limited
on the set {Pa : a ∈ A}.
For any finite set A, any finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H, and
n ∈ N, we define An :=
{
(a1, · · · , an) : ai ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
}
, and H⊗n :=
span
{
v1⊗· · ·⊗ vn : vi ∈ H ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
}
. We also write an for the elements
of An.
Let n ∈ N. We define the n-th memoryless extension of the stochastic ma-
trix V by Vn, i.e., for xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An and yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Bn,
Vn(yn|xn) = ∏ni=1 V(yi|xi).
We define the n-th extension of classical-quantum channel W as follows.
Associated withW is the channel map on the n-blockW⊗n: P (An)→ S(H⊗n),
such that W⊗n(Pn) = W (P1)⊗ · · · ⊗W (Pn) if Pn ∈ P (An) can be written as
(P1, · · · , Pn).
Let θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite set. Let
{
Wt : t ∈ θ
}
be a set of classical-
quantum channels. For tn = (t1, · · · , tn), ti ∈ θ we define the n-block Wtn such
that for Wtn(Pn) = Wt1(P1)⊗ · · · ⊗Wtn(Pn) if Pn ∈ P (An) can be written as
(P1, · · · , Pn).
For a discrete random variable X on a finite set A and a discrete ran-
dom variable Y on a finite set B we denote the Shannon entropy of X by
H(X) = −∑x∈A p(x) log p(x) and the mutual information between X and Y
by I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
. Here p(x, y) is the joint prob-
ability distribution function of X and Y , and p(x) and p(y) are the marginal
probability distribution functions of X and Y respectively, and “log” means
logarithm to base 2.
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For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H) we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ by
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) ,
where “ log” means logarithm to base 2.
Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q
by GP and GQ, respectively. Let φPQ be a bipartite quantum state in S(GPQ).
We denote the partial trace over GP by
trP(φ
PQ) :=
∑
l
〈l|PφPQ|l〉P ,
where {|l〉P : l} is an orthonormal basis of GP. We denote the conditional
entropy by
S(P | Q)ρ := S(φPQ)− S(φQ) .
Here φQ = trP(φPQ). Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For
P ∈ P (A) the conditional entropy of the channel for V with input distribution
P is denoted by
S(V|P ) :=
∑
x∈A
P (x)S(V(x)) .
Let Φ := {ρx : x ∈ A} be a set of quantum states labeled by elements of A.
For a probability distribution Q on A, the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
χ(Q; Φ) := S
(∑
x∈A
Q(x)ρx
)
−
∑
x∈A
Q(x)S (ρx) .
Note that we can always associate a state ρXY =
∑
xQ(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx to (Q; Φ)
such that χ(Q; Φ) = I(X;Y ) holds for the quantum mutual information. For a
set A and a Hilbert space G let V: A→ S(G) be a classical-quantum channel.
For a probability distribution P on A the Holevo χ quantity of the channel for
V with input distribution P is defined as
χ(P ; Φ) := S (V(P ))− S (V|P ) .
We denote the identity operator on a space H by idH and the symmetric
group on {1, · · · , n} by Sn.
For a probability distribution P on a finite set A and a positive constant δ,
we denote the set of typical sequences by
T nP,δ :=
{
an ∈ An :
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a′ | an)− P (a′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ|A|∀a′ ∈ A
}
,
where N(a′ | an) is the number of occurrences of the symbol a′ in the sequence
an.
Let G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let n ∈ N and α > 0.
We suppose ρ ∈ S(G) has the spectral decomposition ρ = ∑x P (x)|x〉〈x|, its
α-typical subspace is the subspace spanned by
{|xn〉, xn ∈ T nP,α}, where |xn〉 :=
⊗ni=1|xi〉. The orthogonal subspace projector onto the typical subspace is
Πρ,α =
∑
xn∈T nP,α
|xn〉〈xn| .
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Similarly let A be a finite set, and G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space. Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For a ∈ A suppose
V(a) has the spectral decomposition V(a) =
∑
j V (j|a)|j〉〈j| for a stochastic
matrix V (·|·). The α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence
an is the subspace spanned by
{⊗
a∈A |jIa〉, jIa ∈ T IaV (·|a),δ
}
. Here Ia := {i ∈
{1, · · · , n} : ai = a} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence
an = (a1, · · · , an) for which the i-th symbol ai is equal to a ∈ A. The subspace
is often referred as the α-conditional typical subspace of the state V⊗n(an). The
orthogonal subspace projector onto it is defined as
ΠV,α(a
n) =
⊗
a∈A
∑
jIa∈T Ia
V(·|an),α
|jIa〉〈jIa | .
The typical subspace has following properties:
For σ ∈ S(G⊗n) and α > 0 there are positive constants β(α), γ(α), and
δ(α), depending on α such that
tr (σΠσ,α) > 1− 2−nβ(α) , (1)
2n(S(σ)−δ(α)) ≤ tr (Πσ,α) ≤ 2n(S(σ)+δ(α)) , (2)
2−n(S(σ)+γ(α))Πσ,α ≤ Πσ,ασΠσ,α ≤ 2−n(S(σ)−γ(α))Πσ,α . (3)
For an ∈ T nP,α there are positive constants β(α)′, γ(α)′, and δ(α)′, depending
on α such that
tr
(
V⊗n(an)ΠV,α(an)
)
> 1− 2−nβ(α)′ , (4)
2−n(S(V|P )+γ(α)
′)ΠV,α(a
n) ≤ ΠV,α(an)V⊗n(an)ΠV,α(an)
≤ 2−n(S(V|P )−γ(α)′)ΠV,α(an) , (5)
2n(S(V|P )−δ(α)
′) ≤ tr (ΠV,α(an)) ≤ 2n(S(V|P )+δ(α)′) . (6)
For the classical-quantum channel V : P (A) → S(G) and a probability dis-
tribution P on A we define a quantum state PV := V(P ) on S(G). For α > 0
we define an orthogonal subspace projector ΠPV,α fulfilling (1), (2), and (3).
Let xn ∈ T nP,α. For ΠPV,α there is a positive constant β(α)′′ such that following
inequality holds:
tr
(
V⊗n(xn) ·ΠPV,α
) ≥ 1− 2−nβ(α)′′ . (7)
We give here a sketch of the proof. For a detailed proof please see [25].
Proof. (1) holds because tr (σΠσ,α) = tr (Πσ,ασΠσ,α) = P (T nP,α). (2) holds be-
cause tr (Πσ,α) =
∣∣T nP,α∣∣. (3) holds because 2−n(S(σ)+γ(α)) ≤ Pn(xn)≤ 2−n(S(σ)−γ(α))
for x ∈ T nP,α and a positive γ(α). (4), (5), and (6) can be obtained in a similar
way. (7) follows from the permutation-invariance of ΠPV,α.
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Definition 2.2. Let A and B be finite sets, and H be a finite-dimensional
complex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, . . . , T} be a finite set. For every t ∈ θ
let Wt be a classical channel P (A) → P (B), and Wt be a classical-quantum
channel P (A)→ S(H). We call the set of the classical channels {Wt : t ∈ θ} an
arbitrarily varying channel and the set of the classical-quantum channels
{Wt : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel when the
channel state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner.
Strictly speaking, the set {Wt : t ∈ θ} generates the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel {Wtn : tn ∈ θn}. When the sender inputs a Pn ∈
P (An) into the channel, the receiver receives the output Wtn(Pn) ∈ S(H⊗n),
where tn = (t1, t2, · · · , tn) ∈ θn is the channel state of Wtn .
Definition 2.3. We say that the arbitrarily varying channel {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A}
on θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A, and b ∈ B∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(b | a′) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(b | a) .
We say that the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A}
on θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A,∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(a′) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(a) .
Definition 2.4. Let A and B be finite sets, and H be a finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ let Wt
be a classical channel P (A) → P (B) and Vt be a classical-quantum channel
P (A)→ S(H). We call the set of the classical/classical-quantum channel pairs
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} an classic arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap chan-
nel, when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, while
the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., Wt in the
pair (Wt, Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel, i.e.,
Vt in the pair (Wt, Vt), respectively.
Definition 2.5. Let A be a finite set. Let H and H ′ be finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ let Wt
be a classical-quantum channel P (A) → S(H) and Vt be a classical-quantum
channel P (A)→ S(H ′). We call the set of the classical-quantum channel pairs
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel, when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, while
the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., Wt in the
pair (Wt, Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel, i.e.,
Vt in the pair (Wt, Vt), respectively.
Definition 2.6. An (n, Jn) (deterministic) code C for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} consists of a stochas-
tic encoder E : {1, · · · , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of
conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive-semidefinite opera-
tors {Dj : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} on H⊗n, which is a partition of the identity, i.e.∑Jn
j=1Dj = idH⊗n . We call these operators the decoder operators.
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A code is created by the sender and the legal receiver before the message trans-
mission starts. The sender uses the encoder to encode the message that he wants
to send, while the legal receiver uses the decoder operators on the channel output
to decode the message.
Remark 2.7. An (n, Jn) deterministic code C with deterministic encoder con-
sists of a family of n-length strings of symbols (cj)j∈{1,··· ,Jn} ∈ (An)
Jn and
a collection of positive-semidefinite operators {Dj : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} on H⊗n
which is a partition of the identity.
The deterministic encoder is a special case of the stochastic encoder when we
require that for every j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, there is a sequence an ∈ An chosen with
probability 1. The standard technique for message transmission over a channel
and robust message transmission over an arbitrarily varying channel is to use the
deterministic encoder (cf. [3] and [13]). However, we use the stochastic encoder,
since it is a tool for secure message transmission over wiretap channels (cf. [9]
and [4]).
Definition 2.8. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} if for
every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, Jn) code
C = (E, {Dnj : j = 1, · · · Jn}) such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
Pe(C, tn) <  , (8)
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ , (9)
where Runi is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · Jn}. Here Pe(C, tn) (the average
probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the channel state
of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
tn = (t1, t2, · · · , tn)), is defined as
Pe(C, tn) := 1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(E( |j))Dj) ,
Ztn =
{
Vtn(E( |i)) : i ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}
}
is the set of the resulting quantum state
at the output of the wiretap channel when the channel state of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
is tn.
The supremum on achievable secrecy rate for the {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called
the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}).
Remark 2.9. A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we
replace (9) with maxt∈θ 1nχ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ.
Remark 2.10. When we defined Wt as A→ S(H) then Pe(C, tn) is defined as
1− 1Jn
∑Jn
j=1
∑
an∈An E(a
n|j)tr(Wtn(an)Dj).
When deterministic encoder is used then Pe(C, tn) is defined as 1− 1Jn
∑Jn
j=1
tr(Wtn(cj)Dj).
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Definition 2.11. We denote the set of (n, Jn) deterministic codes by Λ. A non-
negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under randomness as-
sisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and  > 0, if n is sufficiently large,
there is an s a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG(γ) <  ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Here σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → Pe(Cγ , tn) and
γ → χ (Runi;ZCγ ,tn) are both G-measurable with respect to σ for every tn ∈ θn
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrar-
ily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under non-
secure randomness assisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and  > 0,
if n is sufficiently large, there is an s a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that
log Jn
n > R− δ, and ∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG(γ) <  ,∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Here σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → maxtn∈θn Pe(Cγ , tn)
and γ → maxtn∈θn χ (Runi;ZCγ ,tn) are both G-measurable with respect to σ.
The supremum on achievable secrecy rate for the {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under
randomness assisted coding is called the randomness assisted secrecy capacity
of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, r). The supremum on
achievable secrecy rate for the {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under non-secure randomness
assisted coding is called the non-secure randomness assisted secrecy capacity of
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, rns).
Definition 2.12. An (n, Jn) code C for the classic arbitrarily varying quan-
tum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} consists of a stochastic encoder E :
{1, · · · , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of conditional probabili-
ties E(·|·), and a collection of mutually disjoint sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}}
(decoding sets).
Definition 2.13. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the classic arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} if for
every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, Jn) code
C = (E, {Dj : j = 1, · · · Jn}) such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
1
Jn
max
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
Wnt (D
c
j |E(·|j)) ≤ ε , (10)
and
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ . (11)
The supremum on achievable secrecy rate for the {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called
the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}).
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Definition 2.14. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under
common randomness assisted quantum coding using an amount gn of secret
common randomness, where gn is a non-negative number depending on n, if for
every δ > 0, ζ > 0,  > 0, and sufficiently large n, there is a set of (n, Jn) codes
({Cγ : γ ∈ Γn}) such that 1n log |Γn| = gn, log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Pe(Cγ , tn) <  ,
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, Ztn) < ζ ,
where Runi is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · Jn}.
Unlike in [11] and [12] we require that the randomness to be secure against
eavesdropping here.
The supremum on achievable secrecy rate under random assisted quantum
coding using an amount gn of common randomness of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called
the secret random assisted secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} using an amount
gn of common randomness, denoted by Ckey({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; gn).
Definition 2.15. We say super-activation occurs to two arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} when the
following hold:
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 ,
Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 ,
and
Cs({Wt ⊗W ′t′ , Vt ⊗ V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}) > 0 .
Remark 2.16. For super-activation we do not require the strong code concept.
3 Strong Code Concept
3.1 Classic Arbitrarily Varying Quantum Wiretap Chan-
nel
At first we determine a capacity formula for a mixed channel model, i.e. the
secrecy capacity of classic arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel. This
formula will be used for our result for secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels using secretly sent common randomness.
Theorem 3.1. Let {(W`t, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be a classic arbitrarily varying quantum
wiretap channel. When {W`t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, then
Cs({(W`t, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{Bnq ,Ztn :q,tn}
min
q∈P (θ)
I(pU , B`
n
q )−max
tn∈θn
χ(pU , Ztn) .
Here B`t are the resulting classical random variables at the output of the le-
gitimate receiver’s channels and Ztn are the resulting quantum states at the
output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables
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that satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → A → B`qZt for every B`q ∈
Conv((B`t)t∈θ) and t ∈ θ. A is here a random variable taking values on A, U a
random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution
pU .
Proof. We fix a probability distribution p ∈ P (A) and choose an arbitrarily
positive δ. Let
Jn = b2infB`q∈Conv((B`s)s∈θ) I(p;B`
n
q )−maxtn∈θn χ(p;Ztn )−nδc ,
and
Ln = d2maxtn∈θn (χ(p;Ztn )+nδ) .e
Let p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(T np,δ) if x
n ∈ T np,δ ;
0 else .
and Xn := {Xj,l}j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln} be a family of random matrices whose
components are i.i.d. according to p′.
We fix a tn ∈ θn and define a map V : P (θ)× P (A) → S(H) by
V(t, p) := Vt(p) .
For t ∈ θ we define q(t) := N(t|tn)n . tn is trivially a typical sequence of q. For
p ∈ P (A), V defines a map V(·, p) : P (θ) → S(H).
Let
Qtn(x
n) := ΠV(·,p),α(tn)ΠV,α(tn, xn) · Vtn(xn) ·ΠV,α(tn, xn)ΠV(·,p),α(tn) .
Lemma 3.2 (Gentle Operator, cf. [26] and [21]). Let ρ be a quantum state
and X be a positive operator with X ≤ I and 1− tr(ρX) ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then
‖ρ−
√
Xρ
√
X‖1 ≤
√
2λ . (12)
The Gentle Operator was first introduced in [26], where it has been shown
that ‖ρ−√Xρ√X‖1 ≤
√
8λ. In [21], the result of [26] has been improved, and
(12) has been proved.
In view of the fact that ΠV(·,p),α(tn) and ΠV,α(tn, xn) are both projection
matrices, by (1), (7), and Lemma 3.2 for any t and xn, it holds that
‖Qtn(xn)− Vtn(xn)‖1 ≤
√
2−nβ(α) + 2−nβ(α)′′ . (13)
The following Lemma has been showed in [12]:
Lemma 3.3 (Alternative Covering Lemma). Let V be a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space. Let M and M′ ⊂ M be finite sets. Suppose we have an ensemble
{ρm : m ∈ M} ⊂ S(V) of quantum states. Let p be a probability distribution on
M.
Suppose a total subspace projector Π and codeword subspace projectors {Πm :
m ∈ M} exist which project onto subspaces of the Hilbert space in which the states
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exist, and for all m ∈ M′ there are positive constants  ∈]0, 1[, D, d such that
the following conditions hold:
tr(ρmΠ) ≥ 1−  ,
tr(ρmΠm) ≥ 1−  ,
tr(Π) ≤ D ,
and
ΠmρmΠm ≤ 1
d
Πm .
We denote ω :=
∑
m∈M′ p(m)ρm. Notice that ω is not a density operator
in general. We define a sequence of i.i.d. random variables X1, . . . , XL, taking
values in {ρm : m ∈ M}. If L dD then
Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·ΠXi ·Xi ·ΠXi ·Π− ω‖1
≤ 1− p(M′) + 4
√
1− p(M′) + 42 8√
)
≥ 1− 2D exp
(
−p(M′) 
3Ld
2 ln 2D
)
. (14)
By (2) we have
tr(ΠV(·,p),α(tn))
≤ 2n(S(V(·,p)|q)+δ(α))
= 2n(
∑
t q(t)V(t,p)+δ(α))
= 2n(
∑
t q(t)S(Vt(p))+δ(α)) . (15)
Furthermore, for all xn it holds that
ΠV,α(t
n, xn)Vtn(x
n)ΠV,α(t
n, xn)
≤ 2−n(S(V|r)+δ(α)′)ΠV,α(tn, xn)
= 2−n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
′)ΠV,α(t
n, xn) . (16)
We define
θ′ :=
{
t ∈ θ : nq(t) ≥ √n} .
By properties of classical typical set (cf. [26] ) there is a positive βˆ(α) such that
Pr
p′
(
xn ∈
{
xn ∈ An : (xIt) ∈ Tnq(t)p,δ ∀t ∈ θ′
})
≥
(
1− 2−
√
nβˆ(α)
)|θ|
≥ 1−2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α) ,
(17)
where It := {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : ti = t} is an indicator set that selects the indices
i in the sequence tn = (t1, · · · , tn).
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We denote the set {xn : (xIt) ∈ Tnq(t)p,δ ∀t ∈ θ′} ⊂ An by Mtn . For all
xn ∈ Mtn , if n is sufficiently large, we have∣∣∣∣∣∑
t,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x))−
∑
t
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈θ′,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x))−
∑
t∈θ′
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t/∈θ′,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x))−
∑
t/∈θ′
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
t∈θ′
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x))− q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2|θ| 1√nC
≤ 2|θ| δ
n
C + 2|θ| 1√
n
C , (18)
where C := maxt∈θ maxx∈A(S(V(t, x))+S(Vt|p)). We set Θtn :=
∑
xn∈Mtn p(x
n)Qtn(x
n).
For given zn ∈ Mtn and tn ∈ θn, 〈zn|Θtn |zn〉 is the expected value of 〈zn|Qtn(xn)|zn〉
under the condition xn ∈ Mtn .
We choose a positive β¯(α) such that β¯(α) ≤ min(2−nβ(α), 2−nβ(α)′), and set
 := 2−nβ¯(α). In view of (16) we now apply Lemma 3.3, where we consider the
set Mtn ⊂ An: If n is sufficiently large, for all j we have
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 > 2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√

)
≤ 2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α))
· exp
(
−Ln 
3
2 ln 2
(1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α)) · 2n(
∑
t q(t)S(Vt(p))−
∑
t q(t)S(Vt|p))+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC
)
= 2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
· exp
(
−Ln 
3
2 ln 2
· (1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC)) .
(19)
The equality holds since S(Vt(p))− S(Vt|p) = χ(p;Zt).
Furthermore,
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 > 2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√
 ∀tn ∀j
)
≤ Jn|θ|n2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
· exp
(
−Ln 
3
2 ln 2
(1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC)) .
(20)
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Let φjt be the quantum state at the output of wiretapper’s channel when the
channel state is t and j has been sent. We have
∑
t∈θ
q(t)χ (p;Zt)− χ
(
p;
∑
t
q(t)Zt
)
=
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S
 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
φjt
−∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
q(t)
1
Jn
S
(
φjt
)
− S
 1
Jn
∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
q(t)φjt
+ Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt
)
.
Let HT be a |θ|-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by an orthonormal basis
{|t〉 : t = 1, · · · , |θ|}. Let HJ be a Jn-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by an
orthonormal basis {|j〉 : j = 1, · · · , Jn}. We define
ϕJTH
n
:=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|j〉〈j| ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ φjt .
We have
ϕJH
n
= trT
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|j〉〈j| ⊗ φjt ;
ϕTH
n
= trJ
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|t〉〈t| ⊗ φjt ;
ϕH
n
= trJT
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt .
Thus,
S(ϕJH
n
) = H(Runi) +
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt
)
;
S(ϕTH
n
) = H(Yq) +
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
φjt
 ;
S(ϕJTH
n
) = H(Runi) +H(Yq) +
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S
(
φjt
)
,
where Yq is a random variable on θ with distribution q(t).
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy, it holds that S(ϕJH
n
) +
S(ϕTH
n
) ≥ S(ϕHn) + S(ϕjTHn), therefore
∑
t
q(t)χ (p;Zt)− χ
(
p;
∑
t
q(t)Zt
)
≥ 0 . (21)
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For an arbitrary ζ, we define Ln = d2maxtn χ(p;Ztn )+nζe, and choose a suit-
able α, β¯(α), and sufficiently large n such that 6β¯(α) + 2δ(α) +2δ(α)′ +2|θ| δnC
+2|θ| 1√
n
C ≤ ζ. By (21), if n is sufficiently large, we have Ln ≥ d2n(
∑
t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+ζ)e
and
Ln
3
2 ln 2
(1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC) > 2 12nζ .
When n is sufficiently large for any positive ϑ it holds that
Jn|θ|n2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α) exp(−2 14nζ)
≤ 2−nϑ
and
2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√
 ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) .
Thus for sufficiently large n we have
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) ∀tn ∀j
)
≥ 1− 2nϑ (22)
for any positive %.
In [15] , the following was shown: Let {Xj,l}j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln} be a family
of random variables taking value according to p′. We assume {W`t : t ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable. If n is sufficiently large, and if Jn·Ln ≤ 2infB`q∈Conv((B`t)t∈θ)I(p;B`q)−µ)
for an arbitrary positive µ there exists a set of mutually disjoint sets {Dj,l : j ∈
{1, · · · , Jn}, l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln} on Bn such that for all positive , tn ∈ θn, and
j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}
Pr
p′
[
tr
(
W`tn(Xj,l)Dj,l
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ
]
> 1− 2−nγ , (23)
By (22) and (23), when {W`t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable we can find with
positive probability a realization xj,l of Xj,l and set of mutually disjoint sets
{Dj,l : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln} such that for all positive , tn ∈ θn, and
j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}
max
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
W`tn(D
c
j,l|xj,l) ≤  , (24)
and
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤  . (25)
Here we define E(xn | j) = 1Ln if xn ∈ {xj,l : l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln},
We choose a suitable positive α. For any given j′ ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, by (13) and
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(25) we have ∥∥∥∥∥
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(xj′,l)−Θtn
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(xj′,l)−
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(xj′,l)‖1
+ ‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(xj′,l)−Θtn‖1
≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) +
√
2−
1
2nβ(α) + 2−
1
2nβ(α)
′′
≤ 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α) . (26)
Notice that by (26) we have ‖ 1Jn·Ln
∑Jn
j=1
∑Ln
l=1 Vtn(xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤ 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α).
Lemma 3.4 (Fannes-Audenaert Ineq., cf. [18], [5]). Let Φ and Ψ be two
quantum states in a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space and ‖Φ−Ψ‖ ≤ µ < 1e ,
then
|S(Φ)− S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log(d− 1) + h(µ) , (27)
where h(ν) := −ν log ν − (1− ν) log(1− ν) for ν ∈ [0, 1].
The Fannes Inequality was first introduced in [18], where it has been shown
that |S(X)−S(Y)| ≤ µ log d−µ logµ. In [5] the result of [18] has been improved,
and (27) has been proved.
By Lemma 3.4 and the inequality (26), for a uniformly distributed random
variable Runi with values in {1, . . . , Jn} a and tn ∈ θn, we have
χ(Runi;Ztn)
= S
 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(xj,l)

−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(pi(xj,l))
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣S
 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(xj,l)
− S (Θtn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣S(Θtn)−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(xj,l)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 · 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α) log(nd− 1) + 2h(2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α)) . (28)
By (28), for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, we have
χ (Runi;Ztn) ≤ λ . (29)
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We define E(xn | j) =
{
1
Ln
if xn ∈ {xj,l : l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}} ;
0 if x 6∈ {xj,l : l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}} .
and Dj :=⋃
lDj,l. By (25) and (29), when {W`t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable the deter-
ministic secrecy capacity of {(W`t, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is larger or equal to
lim
n→∞
1
n
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bs)s∈θ)
χ(p; B`nq )− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)
)
− ε . (30)
The achievability of limn→∞ 1n maxU→A→{Bq,Zt:q,t} (infB`q∈Conv((B`s)s∈θ) I(pU ; B`q)
− maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)) and the converse are shown by the standard arguments
(cf. [16] and [6]).
3.2 The Secure Message Transmission With Strong Code
Concept
Now we are going to prove our main result: the secrecy capacity formula for arbi-
trarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels using secretly sent common
randomness. In our previous papers [11] and [12] we determined the secrecy ca-
pacity formula for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Our
strategy is to build a two-part code word, which consists of a non-secure code
word and a common randomness-assisted secure code word. The non-secure one
is used to create the common randomness for the sender and the legal receiver.
The common randomness-assisted secure code word is used to transmit the
message to the legal receiver.
Now we build a code in such a way that the transmission of both the mes-
sage and the randomization is secure. Since the technique introduced in [15] for
classical channels cannot be easily transferred into quantum channels, our idea
is to construct a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel and ap-
ply Theorem 3.1. In [4] a technique has been introduced to construct a classical
arbitrarily varying channel by means of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
channel. However this technique does not work for classical arbitrarily varying
quantum wiretap channel since it cannot provide security. We have to find a
more sophisticated way.
Theorem 3.5. If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈ θ}
is not symmetrizable, then
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{Bq,Zt:q,t}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )−max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
,
(31)
when we use a two-part code word that both parts are secure.
Here Bt are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate
receiver’s channels. Ztn are the resulting quantum states at the output of wire-
tap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the
Markov chain relationships: U → A→ BqZt for every Bq ∈ Conv((Bt)t∈θ) and
t ∈ θ. A is here a random variable taking values on A, U a random variable
taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution pU .
Proof. Since the security of both the message and the randomization implies
the security of only the message, the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
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for the message and the randomization transmission cannot exceed limn→∞ 1n
maxU→A→{B⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn} infBq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ) χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q ) −maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn),
which is the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} for only the message trans-
mission (cf. [12]). Thus the converse is trivial.
For the achievability we at first assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable.
In this case the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} for only the message trans-
mission is zero and there is nothing to prove. At next we assume that for all p ∈
P (U) we have limn→∞ 1n maxU→A→{B⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn}
(
infBq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ) χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )
−maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
≤ 0. In this case the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ} for only the message transmission is also zero and again there is nothing
to prove. Now we assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable and for all
sufficiently large n and a positive 
1
n
max
U→A→{B⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)
)
> 2
(32)
holds.
i) Construction of a Non-Symmetrizable Channel with Random Pre-coding
We consider the Markov chain U → A→ {Bq, Zt : q, t}, where we define the
classical channel P (U)→ P (A) by TU . It may happen that {Wt ◦TU : t ∈ θ} is
symmetrizable although {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, as following example
shows:
We assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} :P (A)→ S(H) is not symmetrizable but there
is a subset A′ ⊂ A such that {Wt : t ∈ θ} limited on A′ is symmetrizable. We
choose a TU such that for every u ∈ U there is a ∈ A′ such that TU (a | u) = 1,
and TU (a | u) = 0 for all a ∈ A\A′ and u ∈ U. It is clear that {Wt ◦TU : t ∈ θ}
is symmetrizable (cf. also [20] for an example for classical channels).
We now use a technique introduced in [20] to overcome this: Without loss of
generality we may assume that |A| = |U| by optimization. Furthermore without
loss of generality we may assume that A = U by relabeling the symbols. For
every n > 1 ∈ N we define a new classical channel T˜nU : P (An) → P (An) by
setting T˜nU := T
n−1
U × idA, i.e.,
T˜nU (a1, · · · , an−1, an) := TnU (a1, · · · , an−1) · δan .
We have
Wtn ◦ T˜nU (a1, · · · , an−1, an) = Wtn−1 ◦ TnU (a1, · · · , an−1)Wtn(an) , (33)
where for tn = (t1, · · · , tn−1, tn) we denote tn−1 := (t1, · · · , tn−1). Since {Wt :
t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, {Wtn ◦ T˜nU : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable. Further-
more, for any positive δ sufficiently large n we have
C({Wtn◦TnU : t ∈ θ}; r) ≤ C({Wtn−1◦Tn−1U : t ∈ θ}; r)+δ ≤ C({Wtn◦T˜n−1U : t ∈ θ}; r)+δ .
For every n > 1 and tn ∈ θn we define Wˇtn : P (Un)→ P (An) by
Wˇtn := Wtn ◦ T˜nU .
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This shows that, if for a non-symmetrizable channel {Wt : t ∈ Θ} we have
(32), then
1
n
max
U→A→{Bˇ⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn}
(
inf
Bˇq∈Conv((Bˇt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ; Bˇ
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)
)
> 
(34)
holds, where Bˇtn are the resulting quantum states at the output of Wˇtn .
ii) Definition of a Classical Arbitrarily Varying Channel Which Is Not Sym-
metrizable
We denote m := log n and define Vˇt := Vt ◦TU for all t ∈ θ. Now we consider
the arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel {(Wˇt, Vˇt); t ∈ θ}. We
choose an arbitrary δ > 0, by (34) if m is sufficiently large we may assume that
for at least one p ∈ P (U)
2 ≤ 2m ≤ b2m infBˇq∈Conv((Bˇs)s∈θ) χ(p;Bˇq)−maxtm∈θm χ(p;Ztm )−mδc .
By Theorem 1 of [12] if m is sufficiently large we can find a (m, 2) code(
Em, {Dmj : j ∈ {1, 2}}
)
and positive λ, ζ such that for some q ∈ P (θ)
1− 1
2
2∑
j=1
tr
(
Wˇ⊗mq (E
m( |j))Dmj
) ≥ 1− 2−m1/16λ (35)
and for all tm ∈ θm and pi ∈ Πm
‖Vˇtm (pi(Em( |j)))−Θtm‖ < 2−
√
mζ (36)
for a Θtm ∈ S(Hm) which is independent of j. Here for pi ∈ Sm we define its
permutation matrix on H⊗m by Ppi.
(Notice that
(
Em, {Dmj : j ∈ {1, 2}}
)
is a deterministic code for a mixed
channel model called compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum
channel which we introduced in [12].)
We now combine a technique introduced in [4] with the concept of superpo-
sition code to define a set of classical channels.
We choose dm2 + 1 Hermitian operators Li ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , dm2 + 1 which
span the space of Hermitian operators on Hm and fulfill
∑dm2+1
i=1 Li = idHm by
the technique introduced in [4]: We choose arbitrarily dm2 Hermitian operators
L¯i ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , dm2 which span the space of Hermitian operators on Hm and
denote the trace of
∑dm2
i=1 L¯i by λ. Now we define Li :=
1
λ L¯i for i ∈ {1, · · · , dm2}
and Ldm2+1 := idHm −
∑dm2
i=1 Li.
Now we defined the classical arbitrarily varying channel {W`tm : tm ∈ θm}
: P (Um)→ P ({1, · · · , dm2 + 3}) by
W`tm(i | pm) :=
{
1
2 tr
(
Wˇtm(p
m)Dmi
)
for i ∈ {1, 2} ;
1
2 tr
(
Wˇtm(p
m)Li−2
)
for i = 3, · · · , dm2 + 3 .
Since 12
∑2
j=1D
m
j +
1
2
∑dm2+1
i=1 Li = idHm we have
dm2+3∑
i=1
W`tm(i | pm) = 1
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for all pm ∈ P (Um). Thus this definition is valid.
When {W`tm : tm ∈ θm} is symmetrizable then there is a {τ(· | am) : am ∈
Um} on θm such that∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | am)W`tm(a′m) =
∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | a′m)W`tm(am)
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , dm2 + 3}. This implies that
1
2
∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | am)tr (Wˇtm(a′m)Li) = 1
2
∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | a′m)tr (Wˇtm(am)Li)
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , dm2 + 1}.
Since {Li : i = 1, · · · , dm2} span the space of Hermitian operators on Hm
we have ∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | am)Wˇtm(a′m) =
∑
tm∈θm
τ(tm | a′m)Wˇtm(am) .
This is a contradiction to our assumption that {Wˇtm : tm ∈ θm} is not sym-
metrizable, therefore {W`tm : tm ∈ θm} is not symmetrizable.
iii) The Deterministic Secrecy Capacity of {(W`tm , Vˇtm) : tm ∈ θm} Is Posi-
tive
By (35) for all q ∈ P (θ) and j ∈ {1, 2} we have
W`q(j | j) ≥ 1
2
− 1
2
2−m
1/16λ , (37)
and for all q ∈ P (θ) and j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}
W`q(j | i) ≤ 1
2
2−m
1/16λ . (38)
We denote the uniform distribution on {1, 2} by R′. For any positive ζ ′ if m
is sufficiently large by (37) and (38) for all q ∈ P (θ) we have
min
q∈P (θm)
I
(
Em(· | R′), B`q
)
> (
1
2
− 1
2
2−m
1/16λ) log(
1
2
− 1
2
2−m
1/16λ)− (1
2
+
1
2
2−m
1/16λ) log(
1
4
+
1
4
2−m
1/16λ)− ζ ′
≥ 1
2
− 2ζ ′ , (39)
where B`q is the resulting distribution at the output of W`q.
Applying the Lemma 3.4 and (36) ifm is sufficiently large for any n′ ∈ N, pos-
itive ζ ′, and for all tmn
′
= (tm1 , · · · , tmn′) = (t1, · · · , tm, tm+1, · · · , t2m, t2m+1, · · · , tmn′)
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∈ θmn′ we have
1
n′
max
tmn′∈θmn′
χ
(
R′⊗n
′
, Zˇtmn′
)
=
1
n′
(
S
 1
2n′
∑
j∈{1,2}n′
Vˇtmn′ ((E
m)⊗n
′
(· | j))
− 1
2n′
∑
j∈{1,2}n′
S
(
Vˇtmn′ ((E
m)⊗n
′
(· | j))
))
≤ 1
n′
∣∣∣∣∣∣S
 1
2n′
∑
j∈{1,2}n′
Vˇtmn′ ((E
m)⊗n
′
(· | j))
− S (Θtmn′ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
n′
∣∣∣∣∣∣S (Θtmn′ )− 12n′
∑
j∈{1,2}n′
S
(
Vˇtmn′ ((E
m)⊗n
′
(· | j))
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
n′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
(
S
1
2
∑
j∈{1,2}
Vˇtmi ((E
m)(· | j))
− S (Θtmi ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
n′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
S (Θtmi )− 12 ∑
j∈{1,2}
S
(
Vˇtmi ((E
m)(· | j)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 · 2−
√
mζ log(dm − 1) + 2 · h(2−
√
mζ)
≤ ζ ′ , (40)
where Zˇtmn′ is the resulting quantum state at the output of Vˇtmn′ .
We choose ζ ′ < 118 and a sufficiently large m such that (39) and (40) hold.
Sine {W`tm : tm ∈ θm} is not symmetrizable, by Theorem 3.1 the deterministic
secrecy capacity of {(W`tm , Vˇtm) : tm ∈ θm} is equal to
lim sup
n′→∞
1
n′
max
p∈P (Um)
min
q∈P (θm)
I(p, B`n
′
q )− max
tmn′∈θmn′
χ(p, Zˇtmn′ ) ≥
1
2
− 3ζ ′ > 1
3
.
iv) The Secure Transmission of the Message with a Deterministic Code
Since (log n)2  3 log(n3) we can build a ((log n)2, n3) code (E˜(logn)3 , {S˜(logn)3i :
i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}}) such that
1− min
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
min
i∈{1,··· ,n3}
W`t(logn)3
(
S˜
(logn)3
i | E˜(logn)
3
(· | i)
)
≤ ε , (41)
and
max
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
∥∥∥Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜(logn)3 (· | i))−Θt(logn)3∥∥∥ ≤ ε (42)
for a Θt(logn)3 ∈ S(H(logn)
3
) which is independent of j.
We define Dj := Lj−2 for j ∈ {3, · · · , dm2 +3}. For i ∈ {1, · · · , n3} we define
D˜
(logn)3
i :=
1
2
∑
jm∈S˜(logn)3i
Djm .
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Here for jm = (j1, · · · , jm) we set Djm = Dj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Djm . Since
∑n3
i=1 D˜
(logn)3
i
= 12
∑
jm∈{1,··· ,dm2+3}m Djm = idHm , {D˜(logn)
3
i : i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}} is a valid set
of decoding operators.
(E˜(logn)
3
, {D˜(logn)3i : i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}}) is a ((log n)3, n3) code which fulfills
min
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
tr(Wˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))D˜(logn)3i ) ≥ 1− 2−n
1/16λ . (43)
v) The Secure Transmission of Both the Message and the Randomization
Index
We choose an arbitrary positive δ. Let
Jn =
1
n
(
max
U→A→{Bnq ,Ztn :q,tn}
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
−δ .
By the results of [20] if n is sufficiently large there is a (n, Jn) common random-
ness assisted quantum code
{(
pi ◦ En, {PpiDnj PTpi : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}}
)
: pi ∈ Sn
}
,
a quantum state Θtn ∈ S(Hn) such that for all tn ∈ θn
1
n!
1
Jn
∑
pi∈Sn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wˇtn (pi(E
n(·|j)))PpiDpi(tn)PTpi
) ≥ 1− 2−n1/16λ , (44)
and for all tn ∈ θn, j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn} and all pi ∈ Sn
‖Vˇtn (pi(En(·|j)))− PpiΘpi(tn)PTpi ‖ < 2−
√
nζ (45)
for a Θtn ∈ S(Hn) which is independent of j.
Using technique in [11] to reduce the amount of common randomness if n is
sufficiently large we can find a set {pi1, · · · , pin3} ⊂ Sn such that
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wˇtn (pi(E
n(·|j)))PpiiDpi(tn)PTpii
) ≥ 1− 2 · 2−n1/16λ , (46)
and
‖Vˇtn (pii(En(·|j)))− PpiiΘpii(tn)PTpii‖ < 2−
√
nζ (47)
Furthermore by the permutation-invariance of p′ we also have Θtn = PpiΘpi(tn)PTpi
for all pi ∈ Sn.
Now we can construct a ((log n)3+n, n3Jn) code
(
E(logn)
3+n, {D(logn)3+ni,j : i =
1, · · · , n3, j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
by
E(logn)
3+n(a(logn)
3+n | i, j) := E˜(logn)3(a(logn)3 |i) · En(pii(an)|j) , (48)
for every a(logn)
3+n = (a(logn)
3
, an) ∈ U(logn)3+n and
D
(logn)3+n
i,j := D˜
(logn)3
i ⊗ (PpiiDnj PTpii) . (49)
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By (43) and (46) for every t(logn)
3+n = (t(logn)
3
, tn) ∈ θ(logn)3+n we have
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wˇt(logn)3+n(E
(logn)3+n(· | i, j))D(logn)3+ni,j
)
=
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
([
Wˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ (Wˇtn(pii(En(·|j))))] [D˜(logn)3i ⊗ (PpiiDnj PTpii)]
)
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
tr
([
Wˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))D˜(logn)3i
]
⊗
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
(
Wˇtn(pii(E
n(·|j))))PpiiDnj PTpii
)
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
(
tr
(
Wˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))D˜(logn)3i
)
· tr
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
(
Wˇtn(pii(E
n(·|j))))PpiiDnj PTpii
)
≥ 1− 1
n1/16
2λ − 2 · 2−n1/16λ
≥ 1− ε (50)
for any positive ε.
By (42) and (47) for every t(logn)
3+n = (t(logn)
3
, tn) ∈ θ(logn)3+n and i ∈
{1, · · · , n3} and j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn} we have
‖Vˇt(logn)3+n(E(logn)
3+n(· | i, j))−Θt(logn)3 ⊗Θtn‖
= ‖Vˇt(logn)3
(
E˜(logn)
3
(· | i)
)
⊗ Vˇtn (pi(En(·|j)))−Θt(logn)3 ⊗Θtn‖
<
1√
n
2ζ + 2−
√
nζ . (51)
Let Rn3 be the uniform distribution on {1, · · · , n3}. We define a random
variable Rn3,uni on the set {1, · · · , n3}×{1, · · · , Rn} by Rn3,uni := Rn3 ×Runi.
Applying Lemma 3.4 we obtain
max
t(logn)3+n∈θ(logn)3+n
χ
(
Rn3,Jn , Zt(logn)3+n
)
≤ max
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
χ
(
Rn3 , Zt(logn)3+n
)
+
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
max
tn∈θn
χ
(
Runi, Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ Ztn,pii
)
= max
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
(
S
 1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3+n(E
(logn)3+n(· | i, j))

− 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3+n(E
(logn)3+n(· | i, j))
)
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+ max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
(
S
 1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ (Vˇtn(pii(En(·|j))))

− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ (Vˇtn(pii(En(·|j))))))
≤ max
t(logn)3∈θ(logn)3
(∣∣∣∣∣S
 1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3+n(E
(logn)3+n(· | i, j))
−Θt(logn)3 ⊗Θtn
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣Θt(logn)3 ⊗Θtn − 1n3
n3∑
i=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3+n(E
(logn)3+n(· | i, j))
∣∣∣∣∣
)
+ max
tn∈θn
1
n3
(∣∣∣∣∣S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ (Vˇtn(pii(En(·|j))))
− Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜(logn)3(·|i))⊗Θtn
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜(logn)3(·|i))⊗Θtn − 1Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
Vˇt(logn)3 (E˜
(logn)3(·|i))⊗ (Vˇtn(pii(En(·|j)))))
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ( 1√
n
2ζ + 2−
√
nζ) log(d(logn)
3 − 1) + h( 1√
n
2ζ + 2−
√
nζ)
+ 2−
√
nζ log(dn − 1) + h(2−
√
nζ)
≤ ε (52)
for any positive ε. Here Zi,tn is the resulting quantum state at Vˇtn after i ∈
{1, · · · , n3} has been sent with E(logn)3 .
For any positive δ, if n is large enough we have 1n log Jn− 1(logn)3+n log Jn ≤ δ.
Thus the secrecy rate of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} to transmission of both the message
and the randomization index is large than
1
n
max
U→A→{Bq,Zt:q,t}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
− 2δ .
4 Further Notice on Code Concepts and Appli-
cations
4.1 Communication With Resources
In our previous papers [11] and [12] we determined the randomness assisted
secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
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Figure 2: Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel with assistance
by shared randomness that is not known by the jammer
In [11] we gave an example when the deterministic capacity of an arbitrar-
ily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is not equal to its randomness-
assisted capacity. Thus having resources is very helpful for achieving a positive
secrecy capacity. For the proofs in [11] and [12] we did not allow the jammer to
have access to the shared randomness.
Figure 3: Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel with assistance
by shared randomness that is known by the jammer
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Now we consider the case when the shared randomness is not secure, i.e.
when the jammer can have access to the shared randomness.
Corollary 4.1. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. We have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; rns) (53)
Proof. Let C = (E, {Dnj : j = 1, · · · Jn}) be an (n, Jn) code such
max
tn∈θn
Pe(C, tn) <  ,
and
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ .
We define a G′ such that G′({C}) = 1, it holds∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG′(γ) <  ,∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG′(γ) < ζ .
Thus every achievable secrecy rate for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is also an achievable
secrecy rate for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under non-secure randomness assisted coding.
Now we assume that there is a G′′ such that∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG′′(γ) <  ,∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG′′(γ) < ζ .
Then for any sn ∈ θn we have∫
Λ
Pe(Cγ , sn)dG′′(γ) ≤
∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG′′(γ) <  ,∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,sn) dG′′(γ) ≤
∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG′′(γ) < ζ .
Thus every achievable secrecy rate for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under non-secure
randomness assisted coding is also an achievable secrecy rate for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ} under randomness assisted coding.
Therefore,
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; rns) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) .
(54)
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At first let us assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable. By [11]
when {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable it holds Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) =
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r). Thus when {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; rns) .
Now let us assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable. When {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
symmetrizable and Jn > 1 hold then by [11] for any (n, Jn) code C there is are
tn ∈ θn and a positive c such that
Pe(C, tn) > c .
Thus when {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable for any G we have∫
Λ
max
tn∈θn
Pe(Cγ , tn)dG(γ) > c ,
which implies we can only have
∫
Λ
maxtn∈θn Pe(Cγ , tn)dG(γ) < c when Jn is
less or equal to 1. This means
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; rns) = log 1 = 0 .
By [11] when {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable it holds Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0
and therefore when {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; rns) .
In [11] we showed that an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel with
zero deterministic secrecy capacity allowed secure transmission if the sender and
the legal receiver had the possibility to use shared randomness as long as the
shared randomness was kept secret against the jammer. Corollary 4.1 shows
that when the jammer is able have access to the outcomes of the shared random
experiment we can only achieve the rate as when we do not use any shared
randomness at all. This means the shared randomness will be completely useless
when it is known by the jammer.
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Figure 4: Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel with assistance
by shared randomness that is not known by the eavesdropper
Applying Theorem 3.5 we can now determine the random assisted secrecy
capacity with the strongest code concept for shared randomness, i.e., the ran-
domness which is secure against both the jammer and eavesdropping.
Corollary 4.2. Let θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite index set. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
When {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, we have
Ckey({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; gn)
= min
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{B⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
+ gn,
max
U→A→{B⊗nq :q}
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )
)
. (55)
Here we use the strong code concept.
Remark 4.3. When gn is positive and independent of n, (55) always holds and
we do not have to assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable.
Proof. We define Γ′n := {1, · · · , d n
3
|Γn|e} it holds n! > |Γ′n×Γn| ≥ n3. Notice that
when gn is positive and independent of n we always have have n! ≥ 2ngn ≥ n3
for sufficiently large n and thus Γ′n := {1}.
We fix a probability distribution p ∈ P (A). Let
Jn = min
(
b2nmins∈θ χ(p;Bs)−logLn+ngn−2nµc, b2nmins∈θ χ(p;Bs)−2nµc
)
,
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Ln = max
(
d2maxtn χ(p;Ztn )−ngn+2nζe, 1
)
.
and p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(Tnp,δ)
, if xn ∈ Tnp,δ ;
0 , else .
Let Xn := {Xj,l : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, l ∈
{1, . . . , Ln}} be a family of random variables taking value according to p′.
It holds JnLn < 2nmins∈θ χ(p;Bs) and Ln2gn > 2maxtn χ(p;Ztn ). Similar to the
proof of Theorem 1 in [11] and Theorem 3.1 in [12], with a positive probability
there is a realization {xj,l : j, l} of {Xj,l, : j, l} and a set {piγ : γ ∈ Γ′n × Γn}
⊂ Sn with following properties:
There exits a set of decoding operators {Dj,l : j = 1, · · · , Jn, l = 1, · · · , Ln, }
such that for every tn ∈ θn  > 0, ζ > 0, and sufficiently large n,
1− 1
Jn
1
Ln
1
|Γ′n × Γn|
Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
j=1
|Γ′n×Γn|∑
γ=1
tr
(
Wtn(pi
−1
γ (xj,l))P
†
piγDj,lPpiγ
)
< 
and
χ
Runi, 1
Jn
1
Ln
1
|Γ′n × Γn|
Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
j=1
|Γ′n×Γn|∑
γ=1
Vtn(pi
−1
γ (xj,l))
 < ζ .
When |Γ′n| > 1 holds we use the strategy of Theorem 3.5 by build a two-part
secure code word, the first part is used to send γ′ ∈ Γ′n, the second is used to
transmit the message to the legal receiver.
Thus
Ckey({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; gn)
≥ min
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
p
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(p;B⊗nq )− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)
)
+ gn,
max
p
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(p;B⊗nq )
)
.
The achievability of limn→∞ 1n
(
minq χ(pU ;Bq) − maxtn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
+gn
and infBq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ) χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q ) is then shown via standard arguments.
Now we are going to prove the converse.
Ckey({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; gn) ≤ max
U→A→{B⊗nq :q}
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q ) (56)
holds trivially.
Let (Eγ,(n), {Dγ,(n)j : j}) be a sequence of (n, Jn) code such that for every
tn ∈ θn
1− 1
Jn
1
2ngn
Jn∑
j=1
2ngn∑
γ=1
tr
(
Wtn(E
γ,(n)(j))D
γ,(n)
j
)
< n
and
χ
Runi, 1
Jn
1
2ngn
Jn∑
j=1
2ngn∑
γ=1
Vtn(E
γ,(n)(j))
 < ζn ,
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where limn→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ ζn = 0. It is known that for sufficiently large
n we have
log Jn ≤ 1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
χ
(
Runi, B
γ⊗n
q
)− χ (Runi, Ztn) . (57)
Let ψj,γ⊗nq := W⊗nq (Eγ,(n)(j)). We denote B˜j⊗nq := {W⊗nq (Eγ,(n)(j)) : γ ∈
Γn} and B˜⊗nq := { 1JnW⊗nq (Eγ,(n)(j)) : γ ∈ Γn}. Let Guni be the uniformly
distributed random variable with value in Γn.
We have
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
χ
(
Runi;B
γ⊗n
q
)− χ(Runi; 1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Bγ⊗nq
)
=
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
ψj,γ⊗nq
− 1
2ngn
1
Jn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
ψj,γ⊗nq
)
−
[
S
 1
2ngn
1
Jn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Jn∑
j=1
ψj,γ⊗nq
− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
ψj,γ⊗nq
)]
=
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
ψj,γ⊗nq
− S
 1
2ngn
1
Jn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Jn∑
j=1
ψj,γ⊗nq

−
[
1
2ngn
1
Jn
2ngn∑
γ=1
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
ψj,γ⊗nq
)− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
1
2ngn
2ngn∑
γ=1
ψj,γ⊗nq
)]
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
Guni, B˜
j⊗n
q
)
− S
(
Guni, B˜
⊗n
q
)
≤ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
Guni, B˜
j⊗n
q
)
≤ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
H (Guni)
= H (Guni)
= ngn . (58)
By (56), (57), and (58) we have
Ckey({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; gn)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{B⊗nq ,Ztn :q,tn}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )
− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
+ gn .
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4.2 Some Applications
In this section we present some applications of our results in [11] and [12].
In [11] it has been shown that the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbi-
trarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is in general not continuous.
Now we deliver the sufficient and necessary conditions for the continuity of the
capacity function of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Corollary 4.4. For an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈
θ} we define
F ({Wt : t}) := min
τ∈C(θ|A)
max
a,a′
∥∥∥∥∥∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(a′)−
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(a)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
,
where C(θ | A) the set of parametrized distributions sets {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A}
on θ. The statement F ({Wt : t}) = 0 is equivalent to {Wt : t ∈ θ} being
symmetrizable.
For an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ}, where Wt : P (A) → S(H) and Vt : P (A) → S(H ′), and a positive δ
let Cδ be the set of all arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels
{(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}, where W ′t : P (A)→ S(H) and V ′t : P (A)→ S(H ′), such
that
max
a∈A
‖Wt(a)−W ′t(a)‖1 < δ
and
max
a∈A
‖Vt(a)− V ′t(a)‖1 < δ
for all t ∈ θ.
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t}), the deterministic secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel is discontinuous at {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} if and
only if the following hold:
1) the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under common randomness assisted
quantum coding is positive;
2) F ({Wt : t}) = 0 but for every positive δ there is a {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ
such that F ({W ′t : t}) > 0.
Proof. At first we assume that the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under
common randomness assisted quantum coding is positive and F ({Wt : t}) =
0. We choose a positive  such that Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t}; cr) − := C > 0. By
Corollary 5.1 in [12] the secrecy capacity under common randomness assisted
quantum coding is continuous. Thus there exist a positive δ such that the for
all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ we have
Cs ({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≥ Cs ({(Wt, Vt) : t}; cr)−  .
Now we assume that there is a {(W ′′t, V ′′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ such that F ({W ′′t :
t}) > 0. This means that {W ′′t : t} is not symmetrizable. By Theorem 1 in [11]
it holds
Cs ({(W ′′t, V ′′t) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs ({(W ′′t, V ′′t) : t}; cr) ≥ C > 0 .
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Since F ({Wt : t}) = 0, {Wt : t} is symmetrizable. By Theorem 1 in [11]
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 .
Therefore the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ} when 1) and 2) hold.
Now let us consider the case when the deterministic secrecy capacity is dis-
continuous at {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}.
We fix a τ ∈ C(θ | A) and a, a′ ∈ A. The map
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} →
∥∥∥∥∥∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(a′)−
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(a)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
is continuous in the following sense: When
∥∥∑
t∈θ τ(t | a)Wt(a′)−
∑
t∈θ τ(t | a′)Wt(a)
∥∥
1
= C holds then for every positive δ and any {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ we have∣∣∣∣∣‖∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)W ′t(a′)−
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)W ′t(a)‖1 − C
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ .
Thus if for a τ ∈ C(θ | A) we have ∥∥∑t∈θ τ(t | a)Wt(a′)−∑t∈θ τ(t | a′)Wt(a)∥∥1
= C > 0 for all a, a′ ∈ A, we also have∥∥∥∥∥∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)W ′t(a′)−
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)W ′t(a)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ C − 2δ .
This means that when F ({Wt : t}) > 0 holds we can find a positive δ such that
F ({W ′t : t}) > 0 holds for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ. By Theorem 1 in [11]
it holds
Cs ({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs ({(W ′t, V ′t) : t}; cr) ≥ C > 0 .
By Corollary 5.1 in [12] Cs ({(W ′t, V ′t) : t}; cr) is continuous.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, F ({Wt : t}) cannot be positive.
We consider now that F ({Wt : t}) = 0 holds. By Theorem 1 in [11]
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} = 0 .
When for every {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ we have F ({W ′t : t}) = 0, then by
Theorem 1 in [11]
Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) = 0
and the deterministic secrecy capacity is thus continuous at {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, for every positive δ there is a {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ such that
F ({W ′t : t}) > 0.
When for every positive δ there is a {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ such that
F ({W ′t : t}) > 0 and Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, cr) = 0 holds, then by Theorem 1
in [11] we have
Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}, cr) ,
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and the deterministic secrecy capacity is continuous at {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, cr) must be positive.
Corollary 4.5. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. When the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is positive then
there is a δ such that for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ we have
Cs ({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) > 0 .
Proof. Suppose we have Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) > 0. Then {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
not symmetrizable, which means that F ({Wt : t}) is positive. In the proof of
Corollary 4.4 we show that F is continuous. Thus there is a positive δ′ such that
F ({W ′t : t}) > 0 for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ′ . When {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable then we have Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, cr) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ})
> 0. By Corollary 5.1 in [12], the secrecy capacity under common randomness
assisted quantum coding is continuous. Thus there is a positive δ′′ such that
Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}, cr) > 0 for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ′′ . We define δ
:= min(δ′, δ′′) and the Corollary is shown.
One of the properties of classical channels is that in the majority of cases,
if we have a channel system where two sub-channels are used together, the
capacity of this channel system is the sum of the two sub-channels’ capacities.
Particularly, a system consisting of two orthogonal classical channels, where
both are “useless” in the sense that they both have zero capacity for message
transmission, the capacity for message transmission of the whole system is zero
as well (“0 + 0 = 0”).
In contrast to the classical information theory, it is known that in quantum
information theory, there are examples of two quantum channels, W1 and W2,
with zero capacity, which allow perfect transmission if they are used together,
i.e., the capacity of their productW1⊗W2 is positive. This is due to the fact that
there are different reasons why a quantum channel can have zero capacity. We
call this phenomenon “super-activation” (“0 + 0 > 0”). In [11] super-activation
has been shown for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Now
we deliver a complete characterization of super-activation for arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Corollary 4.6. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} be two arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
1) If Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 then Cs({Wt ⊗
W ′t′ , Vt ⊗ V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}) is positive if and only if {Wt ⊗W ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable and Cs({Wt ⊗W ′t′ , Vt ⊗ V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}, cr) is positive.
2) If the secrecy capacity under common randomness assisted quantum coding
shows no super-activation for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} then the
secrecy capacity can only then show super-activation for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and
{(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} if one of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} has pos-
itive secrecy capacity under common randomness assisted quantum coding and
a symmetrizable legal channel and while the other one has zero secrecy capacity
under common randomness assisted quantum coding and a non-symmetrizable
legal channel.
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Proof. By Theorem 1 in [11] Cs({Wt ⊗W ′t′ , Vt ⊗ V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}) is equal to
Cs({Wt ⊗ W ′t′ , Vt ⊗ V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}, cr) when {Wt ⊗ W ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable and to zero when {Wt ⊗W ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ} is symmetrizable. Thus
1) holds.
When {Wt : t ∈ θ} and {W ′t : t ∈ θ} are both symmetrizable then there
exists two parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A}, {τ ′(· | a) : a ∈ A}
on θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A, we have ∑t∈θ τ(t | a)Wt(a′) = ∑t∈θ τ(t |
a′)Wt(a),
∑
t∈θ τ
′(t | a)W ′t(a′) =
∑
t∈θ τ ; (t | a′)W ′t(a), We can set τ((t, t′) |
(a, a′)) := τ(t | a)τ ′(t′ | a′) and obtain∑
(t,t′)∈θ×θ
τ((t, t′) | (a1, a′1))Wt(a2)⊗W ′t′(a′2) =
∑
(t,t′)∈θ×θ
τ((t, t′) | (a2, a′2))Wt(a1)⊗W ′t′(a′1)
for all (a1, a′1), (a2, a′2) ∈ A × A, which means that {Wt ⊗W ′t : t, t′ ∈ θ} is
symmetrizable and super-activation does not occur because of 1).
When {Wt : t ∈ θ} and {W ′t : t ∈ θ} are both not symmetrizable then their
secrecy capacities are equal to their secrecy capacities under common random-
ness assisted quantum coding. When Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, cr) = Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) :
t ∈ θ}, cr) = 0. Because of our assumption Cs({Wt⊗W ′t′ , Vt⊗V ′t′ : t, t′ ∈ θ}, cr)
= 0. By 1), super-activation cannot occur.
When one of {Wt : t ∈ θ} and {W ′t : t ∈ θ}, say {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable while the other one is symmetrizable, then Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ})
= 0 indicate that Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, cr) = 0. When Cs({(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈
θ}, cr) is also zero then by our assumption super-activation cannot occur. Thus
2) holds.
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